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troactive application of Wade-Gilbert on virtually the same critical
facts as found in Kirby.8 '1 If, then, Kirby is not to be applied retro-
actively, Saltys' detention was clearly in violation of the Constitution
and the law as it existed at the time of his trial.
The Second Circuit's displeasure with Kirby is manifestly evident
in the majority's frequent approving citations to Wade-Gilbert and its
repeated references to Justice Brennan's vigorous Kirby dissent.302
While the court of appeals cannot directly refuse to follow the Supreme
Court's ruling, it may have set a precedent for distinguishing Kirby in
personal identification cases. Given the critical nature of personal
identification confrontations, especially, as often is the case, when the
identification is the sole evidence connecting the accused with the
commission of a crime, 3°3 the reluctance of the Second Circuit to en-
thusiastically embrace Kirby is clearly understandable.
PERJURY- LIE BY NEGATIVE IMPLICATION
United States v. Bronston
Perjury, under federal law, is defined as the knowing and wilful
giving of a materially false statement in a judicial proceeding under
oath.304 The elements of the crime are: a lawfully administered oath, a
(b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old stan-
dards, and
(c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the
new standards.
Id. at 297. However, the Court was concerned with the retroactive application of a
liberalizing decision; retroactive application of a narrowing criminal law decision is
usually rendered unnecessary by double jeopardy considerations. See generally pp. 237-40
& n.13 supra.
301 In both cases, the confrontation occurred before the commencement of adversary
criminal proceedings. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 684 (1972); Stovall v. Denno, 388
U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
302 465 F.2d at 1027-28.
303 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1972, at 1, col. 3. Lawrence Berson was arrested on
charges of rape and was released on bail. Several days later, he was picked up for the rape
of a fourth woman and was sent to Rikers Island House of Detention. Eyewitness testimony
of the victims was the sole evidence against Berson. After 11 days in the house of detention,
he was released when the police arrested one Richard Carbone who confessed to the crimes
that Berson allegedly committed. Upon comparison, the two looked startlingly alike.
Oklahoma has recognized the critical nature of identification confrontations conducted
prior to the initiation of adversary judicial proceedings by providing attorneys at all
such instances. See Chandler v. State, 501 P.2d 512 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 1972).
304Whoever, having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, officer, or
person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes an oath to
be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or certify truly . . . wilfully
and contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does
not believe to be true, is guilty of perjury ...
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1970). This section replaced § 5392 Revised Statutes which, in turn,
had replaced various perjury statutes adopted from the common law. See, e.g., BLACK-
srorNE's COMMErNrAlUs 808 (B. Gavit ed. 1941).
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competent proceeding, a false and material representation made inten-
tionally. If any of these elements is not established, a perjury conviction
cannot stand.
Although a false statement is the basis of a perjury conviction,
legal issues usually focus upon whether the witness was duly sworn and
under oath, whether the falsehood was material or whether there was
knowing and wilful intent to make an untrue statement. Whereas ma-
teriality8 5 and intent 30 are subject to different interpretations given
varying circumstances, it is normally clear, once the facts are estab-
lished, whether a statement is true or false. Case law has developed
the test of literal truthfulness as the standard to be used in determining
the truth or falsity of a particular statement. The Second Circuit, in
United States v. Bronston 07 has, in effect, adopted a new test by hold-
ing that a non-responsive statement, although literally true, constituted
a lie by negative implication.
Samuel Bronston was the President and sole owner of Samuel
Bronston Productions, Inc., which, between 1958 and 1964, had bank
accounts in several countries. In 1964, a proceeding to reorganize the
corporation was brought under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.08°
During the course of a hearing before a referee, Bronston was asked
several questions aimed at ascertaining the extent of the corporation's
hidden assets. The questions and Bronson's answers, which gave rise to
a perjury indictment and conviction, were as follows:
1. Q. Do you have any bank accounts in Swiss banks, Mr. Bron-
ston? A. No, sir.
2. Q. Have you ever? A. The company had an account there for
about six months, in Zurich.
805 Materiality often becomes an issue when the perjury relates to a statement made
before a grand jury. The test of materiality is whether the false testimony has the
natural effect or tendency to impede, influence or dissuade the grand jury from pursuing
its investigation. See United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v.
McFarland, 371 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 906 (1967); United States v.
Marchisio, 344 F.2d 653 (2d Cir. 1965).
The Second Circuit pointed out in the Stone decision that
a false statement by a witness... even though not relevant in a essential sense
to the ultimate issues pending before the grand jury, may be material in that it
tends to influence or impede the course of the investigation.
429 F.2d at 140.
306Intent can be defined in terms of a statement that is knowingly false. A claim
that a particular question was ambiguous often brings this issue to the fore. See, e.g.,
United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967).
307453 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1971), af'g 326 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), rev'd, 41
U.S.L.W. 4148 (U.S. Jan. 10, 1973).
308 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. (1938).
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3. Q. Have you any nominees who have bank accounts in Swiss
banks? A. No, sir.
4. Q. Have you ever? A. No, sir. 09
At the perjury trial, the government established that, in 1959,
defendant had in fact opened a Swiss bank account in his own name.
The account remained active until 1962 and was closed in 1964.
The Second Circuit majority framed the perjury issue in these
terms: "[W]hether an answer under oath, which is true- but only
half true- can constitute perjury....,,a0
The defendant contended that the "you" (in question number 2
above) was ambiguous. The court acknowledged that a "crucial ele-
ment of the crime of perjury [was defendant's belief] concerning the
verity of his swor testimony"31' and that, to support a perjury con-
viction, the question must be clear enough to elicit an answer defen-
dant knows to be false.312 In rejecting Bronston's claim that the
question was ambiguous, the court stated that his answer clearly indi-
cated that he understood the implication of the question; 13 therefore,
the jury was entitled to find that when defendant testified that "the
company" had had an account in Switzerland, he intended to give
the impression that he personally had not.814 Having decided that the
question was not ambiguous, the court boldly went on to hold:
For the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1621, an answer containing half of
the truth which also constitutes a lie by negative implication, when
the answer is intentionally given in place of the responsive answer
called for by a proper question, is perjury.3 15
309 453 F.2d at 557.
3101d. The materiality of the statement was conceded. Defendant also questioned
the sufficiency of the evidence offered to prove that he had remembered the account at
the time of the questioning which proof was essential to a showing of intentional mis-
representation. The court held the evidence sufficient to present a question of fact for
the jury.
311 Id. The court cited United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204, 210 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965); accord, United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 401 (6th Cir.
1967).
312453 F.2d at 557; accord, United States v. Sweig, 316 F. Supp. 1148, 1164 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) ("an answer that is
nonresponsive [sic] may reflect only misunderstanding, not perjury'), citing United States
v. Cobert, 227 F. Supp. 915 (S.D.Cal. 1964).
313453 F.2d at 559. The jury was instructed that (1) the defendant must have
understood the question and (2) if the question was less precise than it should have been,
that should not be permitted to prejudice the defendant. 326 F. Supp. at 472.
314 453 F.2d at 558.
315 Id. at 559. The court cited only one case, United States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354,
356-57 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 845 (1968) to support this statement. But, in that
case, the defendant was convicted for characterizing his visits to a certain restaurant as
"periodical" when actually he was there almost every night. The issue presented in Rao




The defendant's evasiveness was deemed especially noxious in the
context of a bankruptcy proceeding which is a "searching expedition"
to discover assets of which only the witnesses may have knowledge 16
Where a half-truth results in side-tracking the question, it "is contrary
to the 'whole truth' principle of the oath."3 17 The dissent denounced as
irrelevant the attempt to side-track the questioner3 18 and framed the
issue differently by asking whether a perjury conviction can stand if the
answer is literally truthful but nonresponsive. Judge Lumbard decided
it could not, "even if... motivated by a wilful attempt to conceal." 319
The majority opinion detected two distinguishing factors in prior
decisions which had reversed perjury convictions. In one line of cases,
the defendant's answer was not only literally truthful but also wholly re-
sponsive to the question asked. 20 In the second line of decisions, the
316 453 F.2d at 559; cf. United States v. Sweig, 816 F. Supp. at 1165 (duty in grand
jury proceeding to testify to facts about which the grand jury is concerned, whether a
specific question is asked or not). For a discussion of the distinction between the Sweig
and Bronston decisions, see text accompanying note 321 infra.
317453 F.2d at 559. Since the Bankruptcy Act does not specify the form an oath
should take in bankruptcy proceedings, the defendant did not literally swear "to tell
the whole truth." But the same legal consequences are presumed no matter what specific
words are used, 453 F.2d at 559 n.4, citing 6 J. WIGMoax ON EVIDENcE § 1818 (3d ed. 1940):
The two expedients of the oath and the perjury-penalty are similar in their
operation; that is, they influence the witness subjectively against conscious
falsification, the one by reminding of ultimate punishment by a supernatural
power, the other by reminding of speedy punishment by a temporal power. The
reminder, in the case of the perjury-penalty, is rarely found expressly uttered
in the formula of words for administering an oath or an affirmation; it seems
to be taken for granted as known to the witness.
WIGMORE ON EVIENcE: § 1831 (3d ed. 1940).
318 453 F.2d at 562 n.6. (Lumbard, J., dissenting). The referee's failure to notice that
he was being diverted by defendant's response should have no bearing on the latter's
guilt. Id. at 563. Cf. United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1935) ("the questions
put to [defendant] must search for the truth") (emphasis added).
319 453 F.2d at 560. He also stated that, once a statement is found to be true, there
can be no conviction and the court should not inquire into defendant's state of mind
to see if he hoped his answer would mislead his questioner. 453 F.2d at 561. But the
lower court, whose opinion was affirmed by the majority, said precisely the opposite:
"Thus, although a truthful and responsive answer may not be perjurious, a technically
truthful but unresponsive one may." 826 F. Supp. at 472.
320 See Galanos v. United States, 49 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1931). Defendant in this
case answered "I did not" to the query, "Don't you remember... that you made arrange-
ments yourself for the making of a bond?" Actually he had participated in preliminary
negotiations for procuring the bond and ultimately joined in indemnifying the surety
in order to obtain it. but the court said ".. his negative answer was literally true ..
and reversed the conviction. 49 F.2d at 898.
The court in United States v. Cobert, 227 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1964) held:
This whole rambling answer has little or nothing to do with the question. It
is true that defendant said "No", but the rest of his answer explains that state-
ment. Plainly, you cannot tear one word out of context and predicate a perjury
charge upon it. Defendant was asked if he discussed lay-offs, and answered that
he does not, in fact, lay-off. That is nonresponsive at worst, and in no way
shows that he committed perjury.
227 F. Supp. at 919. The Bronston dissent relied upon Cobert to support its claim that
1972]
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question posed was ambiguous and, therefore, the defendant's answers
were both literally true and responsive if the questions were construed
in accordance with one of their possible interpretations. 821 The dis-
senting opinion, on the other hand, argued that literal accuracy was
the sole test used in these cases and that "precision and responsiveness
are not relevant to the crime of perjury."822
The false impression given by Bronston's deceptive answer could
have been and possibly should have been remedied in the court room
and not at a later perjury trial. Had Bronston been asked, "Do you
remember if you ever had bank accounts in Swiss banks," a negative
response would most likely have led to further questioning and an
avoidance of a perjury conviction even though it, like the answer given
to the question actually asked, could well have been misleading. The
a non-responsive answer cannot be the basis for a perjury conviction. 453 F.2d at 562
n.7. See United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398 (6th Cir. 1967), which held that defendant
could not be convicted for perjury based on an answer which was "literally accurate,
technically responsive or legally truthful." 371 F.2d at 400, citing Smith v. United
States, 169 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1948).
The Bronston majority distinguished the ambiguity of the words "on a trip" in
Wall with the precision of the word "you" in the question posed to Bronston. In Wall,
the defendant was asked "Have you ever been on trips with Mr. X?" and replied, "I
have not." Since, the court said the question was capable of two interpretations, it was
necessary to determine what the question meant to the witness. The defendant and
Mr. X had, in fact, been in Florida together although they did not travel there together.
Since the question might have meant "Have you ever accompanied Mr. X on a trip?"
the "literally truthful" test spared the defendant. 371 F.2d at 399.
The dissenting opinion in Bronston favorably cited Galanos for the proposition that
a perjury was not committed merely because the literally true answer would be some-
what modified if the defendant had been asked to state all the circumstances supporting
his answer. 453 F.2d at 562.
821 See United States v. Cobert, 227 F. Supp. 915 (S.D. Cal. 1964). The majority
in Bronston emphasized the ambiguity of one of the questions asked in Cobert which had
elicited an alleged perjurious response; i.e., the use of the unfamiliar phrase "listing
post." 453 F2d at 558-59.
The dissent in Bronston focused upon a different aspect of the Cobert case.
The following dialogue had occurred:
Q. Between you and Hy Kamin has there ever been any discussion about lay-offs?
A. About lay-offs?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. No. We don't lay-off. We cut the bet down at source. That's why I told you
I'd rather take you at 10 percent and not him. His I'd sooner turn down.
227 F. Supp. at 917.
The Bronston dissent uses the following logic to distinguish cases which turned
upon the ambiguity of a question: in those cases the defendants could be found to have
answered both responsively and truthfully if one of the permissible interpretations of
the question was used. If the perjurious interpretation was used, he would again be
found to have answered responsively but falsely. Bronston's answer, on the other hand,
was unresponsive although literally truthful. The dissent pointed out:
Were we to focus on cases dealing with ambiguous questions the true analogy
would be to a case where a question was found susceptible to two interpretations
and the defendant's answer was responsive to neither.
453 F.2d at 562 n.4.
822 453 F.2d at 562.
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answer "No" to the inept question "Do you remember..'." is respon-
sive to the question but is incapable of objective analysis as to its
truthfulness. When confronted with such a response, a competent at-
torney would attempt to refresh the witness's recollection. Bronston's
non-responsive answer should have been remedied, not by a perjury
conviction but rather by another probative question pinning down the
truth.
A witness's answer that he does not remember certain acquaint-
ances or transactions can be a basis for a perjury conviction.323 Even
though defendant's answer is purely subjective, his knowledge of the
facts presented in the question can be proven through circumstantial
evidence showing a motive to lie together with evidence establishing
the frequency and nearness to the present time of the acts in question.
A jury could then conclude that the defendant had lied when he stated
that he did not recall the acquaintances or transactions presented in the
question.
Bronston, however, did not lie when he stated that the company
had a Swiss bank account. His answer may be labeled as evasive or
deceptive, but it was nevertheless literally true. His response was not a
subjective statement which may or may not have been true depending
upon its credibility.
The element of non-responsiveness in Bronston's answer was not
the decisive factor underlying his conviction. Had Bronston replied
"The Swiss Alps are a winter wonderland" to a question about his
bank accounts, he certainly would not have been convicted of perjury.
Rather, one must conclude that the element of deception, the negative
implication contained in his answer, served as the sole basis for his
conviction. A deceptive answer which is literally truthful does not
merit a perjury conviction in light of the prior case law on this subject.
Many defendants have uttered deceptive and misleading answers which,
fortunately for them, were technically accurate. For example, in United
States v. Slutzky, 24 the defendant was asked whether he had ever been
convicted of a felony. His negative response must have seriously mis-
led the average juror for he had in fact been convicted upon a very
grievous charge. Yet Slutzky's perjury conviction was reversed because,
in that jurisdiction, no crimes were classified as felonies.
The majority opinion in Bronston attempts to distinguish this
genre of decisions by employing a responsive-non-responsive dichotomy.
823 See, e.g., United States v. Sweig, 441 F.2d 114 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932
(1971).
324 79 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1935).
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But the responsiveness of an answer logically should be an irrelevant
consideration when falsity is in issue.
One can sympathize with the majority's dissatisfaction with the
court-created doctrine of literal truthfulness which at times has shel-
tered deceptive answers. Such a doctrine contradicts the spirit of the
usual oath whereby one swears to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth. However, one could ask why, in the context of
an adversary system that applauds quick-witted and cunning lawyers
for winning cases by sharp questioning techniques, should it be deemed
objectionable that a witness who is often a potential defendant (and
thus is, in his own eyes, in an adversary proceeding) manages to outwit
his interrogator by an evasive but truthful answer?
Furthermore, since the element of falsity is basic to the success of
a perjury action,325 it is imperative that it be dealt with strictly and
that it not be established by imprecise standards. Again and again, the
test of "literal truthfulness" has been applied as the standard of
falsity.326 Now, whether its basis for upholding Bronston's conviction
was that his answer was "a lie by negative implication" or "nonrespon-
sive," the Second Circuit has, without valid precedent, broadened that
standard. If the decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court327 it would
greatly expand the grounds for future perjury actions.328
325 Perjured evidence as a ground for a new trial rests upon three factors, the first
of which is that "the court is reasonably well satisfied that the testimony given by a
material witness is false." T. HousEr g& G. WALsER, DEFENDING AND PROSECUTING FEDERAL
CRiMiNAL CAsES 716 (2d ed. 1946).
3265ee United States v. Wall, 371 F.2d 398, 400 (6th Cir. 1967); Blumenfeld v. United
States, 306 F.2d 892, 897 (8th Cir. 1962); Smith v. United States, 169 F.2d 118, 123 (6th
Cir. 1948) (defendant's conviction was upheld only because the jury found that his
answer was not literally true, the court having charged the jury that "if you find from
the testimony that the defendant's answers to the agent's questions were literally true,
you cannot find him guilty . . .'); Hart v. United States, 131 F.2d 59, 61 (9th Cir. 1942)
(defendant had given money to her sister to buy and furnish a house. Defendant's
testimony that she did not own the property was held "legally truthful" since the house
was in her sister's name); United States v. Slutzky, 79 F.2d 504, 505 (3d Cir. 1935)
(defendant answered "No" to the question of whether he had ever been convicted of a
felony in New Jersey. Since New Jersey classified crimes as "misdemeanors" or "high
misdemeanors" only, the answer was legally truthful, thereby necessitating a reversal of
a conviction.); Galanos v. United States, 49 F.2d 898, 899 (6th Cir. 1931).
327 Cert. granted, 405 U.S. 1064 (1972).
828Bronston has recently been cited favorably in United States v. Kahn, 340 F. Supp.
485, 490 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). The defendant claimed the question leading to the perjury
conviction was ambiguous but it can be distinguished from Bronston because, once the
claim of ambiguity was rejected, the answers were found to be not literally true. Defendant
had claimed that payments made after negotiations were not "part and parcel" or "in
connection with" negotiations, a "semantic game that [the] court will not countenance."
540 F. Supp. at 490 n.4.
